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Even after twenty years existence of a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
European Union, the division of competences between the Union and its Member 
States in this area remains unclear. Insight in this division has become more 
important in view of the increasing role of the EU in global security governance.3 
Due to its complex and to some extent sui generis nature, the question to which 
extent the EU would in general be covered by the rules on international legal 
responsibility has led to some debate. However, most contributions focused 
exclusively on the European Community, or ‒ later ‒ on the Union‟s competences 
on the basis of the TFEU.4 The relevance of more clarity regarding the different 
roles an international organization and its Member States play at the global scene 
was recently underlined, when the Court of Appeals in The Hague ruled that The 
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Netherlands was responsible for some actions of military personnel as part of the 
UN military mission during the Srebrenica crisis in 1995.5 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon clarified the international legal status of the European Union 
by codifying its international legal personality (Article 7 TEU). At the same time it 
refrained from categorising the nature of the competence under both the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) under one of the headings in Title I TFEU: exclusive competences (Article 
3), shared competences (Article 4), and competences to support, coordinate, or 
supplement the actions of the Member States (Articles 5 and 6). Article 2(4) TFEU 
merely states that a competence exists:6 „The Union shall have competence, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, to define and 
implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing 
of a common defence policy.‟ One may argue that CFSP and CSDP are not 
categorised in the TFEU because these policy areas (in contrast to all other policy 
areas of the Union) do not find their basis in the TFEU, but in the TEU. Yet, even 
there no express indications can be found as to the type or division of competence 
we are dealing with in this area. While it may be tempting to argue that we are most 
probably dealing with a combination of supportive, coordinating, supplementing, or at best 
shared competences,7 the exclusion of mixed agreements calls for international 
agreements in the area of CFSP and CSDP to be exclusively concluded by the EU.8 
The purpose of the present contribution is to investigate some questions emerging 
from the new and ambitious global role of the EU in combination with the unclear 
division of international responsibility between the EU and its Member States in the 
area of foreign, security and defence policy. In that sense this paper aims to 
contribute to the on-going debate on the relationship between international law and 
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EU law,9 albeit with a strict focus on the perhaps still different position of CFSP 
and CSDP. As the EU has become increasingly active in global governance, the 
questions of who takes responsibility (internally) and who can be held responsible (externally) 
become more important. 
 
The following section will re-assess the division of competences within the post-
Lisbon European Union in the area of CFSP and CSDP. The main question here is 
who may act under CFSP and CSDP. Furthermore, the analysis will present the 
international legal framework regarding international responsibility of the EU and its 
Member States in the area of CFSP and CDSP. In the concluding section we aim to 




I. Who Acts under CFSP and CSDP? 
 
A. The Nature of the European Union 
 
The legal nature of the European Union remains important in order to be able to 
say something on its possible international responsibility. The Lisbon Treaty not 
only integrated the European Community into the European Union, but the current 
Treaty on European Union also explicitly provides that „The Union shall have legal 
personality‟ (Article 7), thus making an end to the academic discussion on the legal 
status of the Union.10 That there is still some uneasiness on the part of some 
Member States, is reflected in Declaration No. 24, attached to the Lisbon Final Act: 
„The Conference confirms that the fact that the European Union has a legal 
personality will not in any way authorise the Union to legislate or to act beyond the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties.‟ Like many 
Declarations, this one is also stating the obvious. After all, the principle of attributed 
(or conferred) powers forms a starting point in international institutional law and is 
even explicitly referred to in the new TEU, this time with no exception for the 
(CFSP):  
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„Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of 
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to 
attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the 
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States‟(Article 5).11  
 
Similar careful considerations can be found in Declarations no. 13 and 14, which 
underline that the changes „do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as 
they currently exist [...]‟12 and do not „prejudice the specific character of the security 
and defence policy of the Member States‟.  
 
Hence, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty we are left with one 
international legal entity: the European Union. And, it is difficult not to regard this 
entity as an international organization and hence within the scope of the Draft 
Articles on the International Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO) 
as adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) of the UN in August 2011 
and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 2011.13 This latest version 
of the Draft Articles is the latest stage in a development that started in 2002, when 
the ILC took up this project. The convergence of the „bits and pieces‟ that were 
originally said to make up the Union‟s structure14 has created a new institutional and 
normative situation. Indeed, the past years revealed that the nature of the Union can 
best be understood when the complex relation between the different policy areas 
and between the Union and its Member States is taken into account.15 This complex 
nature has not prevented the Union from becoming an international „independent 
actor‟.16  
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the work of that session (A/66/10) (2011) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 
II, Part Two, 5, see in particular pt. 6 where the Commentary refers to Art. 57 of the Arts. 
on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. 
14  Cf. D Curtin, „The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces‟ 
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Indeed, by now is has become widely accepted that the EU as such may bear 
international responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.17 It seems to fit the 
definition of an international organization used in the DARIO:  
 
„For the purposes of the present draft articles, the term “international 
organization” refers to an organization established by a treaty or other 
instrument governed by international law and possessing its own legal 
personality. International organizations may include as members, in addition 
to States, other entities‟.  
 
Obviously, the act must be attributable to the EU under international law.18 It has 
been observed that the ILC Draft Articles make no mention of the notion of 
„regional economic integration organization‟ (REIO).19 This notion was invented to 
permit an organization like the EU to participate in multilateral treaties and 
conventions as a contracting party alongside states.20 In the absence of special rules 
for the EU, we will follow the general rules on responsibility of international 
organizations in our assessment of the responsibility of the EU and its Member 
States in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. 
  
 
B. The Legal Nature of the External Competence: CFSP 
 
Although „the nature of the Union‟s external competence is an important factor in 
the allocation of international responsibility‟,21 this nature is not so easy to establish 
in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. As indicated above, both CFSP 
and CSDP are not mentioned in the categorisation of competences in Article 3 
TFEU. There are indeed good reasons to argue in favour of a „shared competence‟ 
external action in this area. A shared competence allows both the Union and its 
Member States to take the necessary decisions, but Member States‟ competences 
may be exercised only to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence 
(Article 2, paragraph 2 TFEU). In fact, it could be argued that this is the case in 
CFSP. Although there are good reasons to presume that pre-emption does not 
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apply to CFSP,22 it is equally difficult to maintain that established CFSP decisions 
and international agreements do not at all restrict Member States‟ freedom to act 
externally. As argued elsewhere, possible internal restraints on Member States‟ 
freedom to conclude international agreements in CFSP fields can stem from both 
CFSP treaty norms and CFSP secondary measures. The degree of restraining effect 
of those CFSP norms is also determined by the potential role that the judiciary may 
play in ensuring that those norms are enforced, as well as the interpretation given to 
the specific CFSP principle of loyal cooperation.23 As „rules of the organization‟ (see 
section II below) these restraints may play a role in establishing responsibilities. 
 
In that sense, the effect of CFSP norms on Member States‟ powers could be 
envisaged in the light of the Court‟s pronouncements on the effects of Community 
powers in the fields of development cooperation or humanitarian aid. This case law 
suggests that since the Community competence in these fields is not exclusive but 
„parallel‟, the Member States are accordingly entitled to enter into commitments 
themselves vis-à-vis non-Member States, either individually or collectively, in the 
Council or outside it, or even jointly with the Community.24 If we would accept the 
idea of „shared‟ competences under CFSP, Member States would have less room for 
manoeuvre. Could this even lead to „exclusivity‟ in relation to CFSP? Article 3, 
paragraph 2 TFEU reads:  
 
„The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an 
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative 
act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter 
their scope‟.  
 
Indeed, CFSP rules will not find their basis in a „legislative act‟.25 That being said, 
when this provision is read in conjunction with the loyalty principle enshrined in 
Article 28, paragraph 4 TEU, it seems too early to rule out exclusivity in the field of 
CFSP completely, particularly in view of the fact that the Court would have 
                                                             
22  See Cremona, above, 65 as well as D Thym, „The Intergovernmental Constitution of the 
EU‟s Foreign, Security & Defence Executive‟ (2011) EUConst 453. 
23  C Hillion and RA Wessel, „Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under 
CFSP‟, in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional 
Fundamentals (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008) 79.  
24  Joined Cases C–181/91 and C–248/91 European Parliament v Council of the European 
Communities and Commission of the European Communities [1993] ECR I–3685 (Bangladesh 
case); Case C–316/91 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [1994] ECR I–625 
(EDF case). 
25  See Arts. 24(1) TEU and 298(3) TFEU. 
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jurisdiction in respect of this Article. After all, the Union‟s external activities in the 
form of the conclusion of international agreements are booming and Member 
States‟ actions increasingly risk affecting common rules or altering their scope. 
While the creation of CFSP norms depends on the political will of the Member 
States, once these norms have been established, their very purpose is to restrict the 
freedom Member States traditionally enjoy in their external relations. Allowing 
Member States to affect ‒ or even act contrary to ‒ common norms established by 
EU international agreements would amount to rendering most of the CFSP and 
CSDP provisions in the EU Treaty nugatory. 
 
Also in relation to possible international responsibility, the emerging question is 
whether a hierarchy of competences can be established: to what extent are Member 
States bound by agreements concluded by the Union, and do these agreements 
restrict their individual freedom in external relations? In this respect, there appears 
to be no reason not to apply the so-called Haegeman doctrine to CFSP agreements 
and to regard them as forming „an integral part of Union law‟.26 Article 216(2) 
TFEU indeed states that Member States are automatically bound by the agreements 
as a matter of EU law and vis-à-vis the EU. The question remains whether perhaps 
a „direct effect‟ of the agreements could even be construed.27 This would place the 
Member States in a different position towards the agreements than in other 
international organisations. Yet, no a priori external effects result from this.28 
 
 
C. To What Extent are Member States Bound by EU External Action? 
 
Indeed, apart from the question on the nature of the competence, the question who 
is bound (internally, inside the EU) by international agreements (and perhaps 
decisions) concluded in the area of CFSP and CSDP seems important to be able to 
assess the division of possible international responsibility. 
 
                                                             
26  As provided by the ECJ in relation to international agreements concluded by the European 
Community: Cases C–181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449 and C–104/81 Kupferberg [1982] 
ECR 3641. See in the same line D Thym, „Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge der 
Europäischen Union‟ (2006) 66 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 900. 
27  See for a negative answer to this question Thym, „The Intergovernmental Constitution‟, 
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28  Cf. also the Drafting history of the infamous Arts. 36 bis of the 1986 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. C Bröllmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law: 
International Organisations and the Law of Treaties (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007). 
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In the area of CFSP and CSDP, international agreements are concluded by the 
Union. The Union has made full use of its competence in this area.29 By using the 
pre-Lisbon Article 24 TEU competence (in conjunction with Article 38 TEU in the 
case of agreements in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters), the European Union has entered the international stage as a legal actor 
with obligations and responsibilities. This turned the provision into the general legal 
basis for the Union‟s treaty making whenever agreements could not be based on the 
Community Treaty. These days, the competence to conclude international 
agreements can be found in one single legal basis for the entire Union: Article 216 
TFEU, which provides:  
 
„The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or 
international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the 
framework of the Union‟s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the 
Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding act of the Union or is likely to 
affect common rules or alter their scope.‟  
 
That this competence stretches beyond the TFEU itself and includes the domain of 
CFSP is underlined by Article 37 TEU, which provides that „the Union may 
conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations in areas 
covered by this Chapter‟ (named „Specific provisions on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy‟).30 
 
All international agreements are, in the end, concluded by the Council.31 In contrast 
to other Union areas, no mixed agreements are concluded in the area of CFSP and 
                                                             
29  Cf. A Sari, „The Conclusion of International Agreements by the European Union in the 
Context of the ESDP‟ (2008) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53; P Koutrakos, 
„International Agreements in the Area of the EU‟s Common Security and Defence Policy‟, 
above; and RA Wessel, „The EU as a Party to International Agreements: shared 
competences, mixed responsibilities‟, in A Dashwood and M Maresceau (eds.), Law and 
Practice of EU External Relations (Cambridge, University Press, 2008) 152. Indeed, these 
„agreements‟ can be considered treaties in the sense of Art 2(1)(a) of the 1969 and 1986 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties as they fulfil all generally accepted criteria. See, 
in general, A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge, University Press, 2007); and J 
Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 
1996). Most agreements can be found in the international agreements database of the 
Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/). 
30  This Chapter (2) also includes Section 2: Provisions on the Common Security and Defence 
Policy. 
31  The debate on whether these agreements are concluded by the Council on behalf of the 
Union or on behalf of the Member States seems not only to be superseded by practice but 
also accepted by most experts in EU external relations law. Cf. R Gosalbo Bono „Some 
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CSDP. In fact, the entire decision-making process as well as the conclusion of the 
agreement does not reveal a separate role for the Member States. Apart from the 
references to the EU in both the texts and the preamble of the agreements and the 
fact that adoption and ratification is done „on behalf of the Union‟, this is confirmed 
by the central role of the Union‟s institutions and organs, and the final publication 
in the L-series of the Official Journal (decision on inter se agreements of the Member 
States are published in the C-series). Indeed, „fairly strange operations would be 
needed to demonstrate that a treaty concluded under such circumstances has instead 
created legal bonds between the third party concerned and each one of the Member 
States of the European Union‟.32 
 
Nevertheless ‒ and in line with our observations in the previous section ‒ internally 
both the Union and its Member States seem to be bound by the agreements. This is 
underlined by Article 216, par. 2, which simply states: „Agreements concluded by the 
Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States.‟ 
Prima facie, for third parties this does not change anything: only obligations for the 
EU arise from these international agreements and Member States obligations 
subsequently follow on the basis of Union law. At the same time, the question 
emerges whether this provision would play a role in the light of the special position 
of „the rules of the organization‟ in the law on the responsibility of international 
organizations (infra).33 
 
EU external action, however, not only takes shape in the form of international 
agreements. International responsibility may be triggered on the basis of a number 
of other actions and situations, including the external effects of CFSP decisions, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order‟ (2006) CMLRev, 354; Thym, „Die völkerrechtlichen 
Verträge der Europäischen Union‟, above, 863; C Tomuschat, „The International 
Responsibility of the European Union‟ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union As an 
Actor in International Relations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 181; RA Wessel, 
„The EU As a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences? Mixed 
Responsibilities?‟ in A Dashwood and M Maresceau (eds), The Law and Practice of EU 
External Relations—Salient Features of a Changing Landscape (Cambridge, University Press, 
2008) 145; and RA Wessel and G Fernandez Arribas, „EU Agreements with Third 
Countries: Constitutional Reservations by Member States‟ in S Blockmans (ed), The 
European Union and International Crisis Management: Legal and Policy Aspects (The Hague, TMC 
Asser Press, 2008) 291. 
32  C. Tomuschat, „The International Responsibility of the European Union‟, above, 181–2. 
Cf. also P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union (Oxford, University Press, 
2004) 159; P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 
406–9 and Gosalbo Bono, „Some Reflections‟, above, 354–6. 
33  See extensively on these rules: C Ahlborn, „The Rules of International Organizations and 




CSDP actions and missions and the participation of the EU in international 
organizations.34 Within the limited scope of the present chapter we will only be able 
to touch upon some of these issues. 
 
III. EU External Action and International Responsibility 
 
In our assessment of the applicable rules we will follow the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations, adopted on second reading in 2011. 
On the basis of Article 1, the Draft Articles „apply to the international responsibility 
of an international organisation for an internationally wrongful act‟; as well as „to the 
international responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act in 
connection with the conduct of an international organisation‟.35 Not being dealt 
with in the Articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, 
the latter paragraph is meant to inter alia incorporate those cases of State 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts by an international organisation 
where a State is a member of that organisation, such as the Member States of the 
Union.36  
 
The DARIO suggest as a point of departure that the EU is responsible for its own 
internationally wrongful acts. Draft Article 3 states: „Every internationally wrongful 
act of an international organization entails the international responsibility of that 
organization‟. Article 4 lists the conditions for an internationally wrongful act by an 
international organization that entails the international responsibility of that 
organization: „There is an internationally wrongful act of an international 
organization when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to 
the international organization under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach 
                                                             
34  See on the latter KE Jørgensen and RA Wessel, „The Position of the European Union in 
(other) International Organizations: Confronting Legal and Political Approaches‟, in P 
Koutrakos (ed.), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Chaltenham, Edward 
Elgar Publishers, 2011) 261. 
35  The wording of this second paragraph used to read (in the 2009 version): „The present 
draft articles also apply to the international responsibility of a State for the internationally 
wrongful act of an international organisation‟ [Emphasis added]. One may assume that the 
wording was changed since the conduct of the international organisation need not 
necessarily be wrongful, for example in the case of coercion. The authors thank Christiane 
Ahlborn (PhD Researcher, University of Amsterdam) for this valuable comment. See for 
the previous version of the Draft Arts.: ILC, „Draft Arts. on the Responsibility of 
International Organisations‟ (2009) Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
61st session, UN Doc. A/C.6/64/10, 39.  
36  See in particular pt. 6 of the DARIO Commentaries where the Commentary refers to Art. 
57 of the Arts. on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. 
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of an international obligation of that organization‟. The next question is what 
conduct can be attributed to the Union.  
 
According to Draft Article 6(1):  
 
„The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the 
performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of 
that organization under international law, whatever position the organ or 
agent holds in respect of the organization.‟  
 
This somewhat obvious rule indicates that conduct by organs and agents can 
establish the international responsibility of the Union. According to Draft Article 
6(2), the „rules of the organisation‟ shall be applied when determining the „organs 
and agents‟.37 In view of the Union rules on „internal‟ responsibility, there are good 
reasons to interpret the term „organs and agents‟ as „institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies and their servants‟ as used is in the TFEU.38 In any case, as is suggested by 
the broad definitions of „organs and agents‟ in Draft Articles 2(c) and (d), the Draft 
Articles do not envisage the attribution of conduct to „depend on the use of 
particular terminology in the internal law‟ of the Union.39  
 
In the area of CFSP/CSDP this would thus cover not only conduct of the Council, 
but also of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy, 
the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU External Action Service 
(EEAS), agencies, such as the European Defence Agency or the EU Institute for 
Security Studies and of individual representatives in the framework of EU‟s CFSP. 
It would also include the EU delegations (transformed from „Commission 
delegations‟ as they existed in the pre-Lisbon era) and civilian and military missions. 
However, these missions are probably better covered by Article 7, as discussed 
below. At the same time, however, Article 6 also raises the question of whether 
                                                             
37  This is not the only criterion however, as „in exceptional circumstances, functions may be 
considered as given to an organ or agent even if this could not be said to be based on the 
rules of the organisation‟: Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 19. 
38  Cf. Hoffmeister, above, 740, who refers to Arts. 340(2) and 263 TFEU as well as to Art. 
51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Art. 10(2) confirms that also „the breach 
of any international obligation that may arise for an international organisation towards its 
members under the rules of the organisation‟ is included in the Draft Arts. Ahlborn argues 
that this second paragraph could have been deleted, see: C Ahlborn, above.  
39  Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 17. The commentary invokes also some case law on 
the point such as the ICJ Advisory Opinion, Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the 
United Nations, ICJ Reports 1949, 177, where the Court held that an agent is „any person 
through whom it [the international organisation] acts‟. 
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Member States could, in certain cases, be seen as organs or agents of the Union.40 It 
is here that some argue, although it is not expressly acknowledged by the ILC,41 that 
the „organic link‟ between an IO and Member States is relevant.42 For example, as 
even the ILC Rapporteur acknowledges,43 WTO case law accepted Member States 
as „organs‟ and „agents‟ of the Union in several instances.44 Moreover, from inter alia 
EU case law it can be deduced that the notion of „normative control‟ by the Union 
over its Member States is relevant to establish an „organ‟ or „agent‟ situation, even if 
the Member State action merely „falls in the scope of Union law‟ (as opposed to 
situations of MS implementing Union law). Hoffmeister describes these situations as 
those in which „the Member States are under a duty not to overstep certain 
boundaries set by Union law‟ and concludes from EU case law that „when it is 
established that Union law governs both the substantive legality of and the available 
remedies for a measure, then the Union exercises normative control over it.‟45 This 
EU case law is relevant, especially in light of the increased importance of „rules of 
the organisation‟ in the 2011 Draft Articles.46 In the area of CFSP these cases would 
arguably be rare, but cannot be fully ruled out. An example could be Member State 
conduct vis-à-vis a third State falling in the scope of a CFSP agreement concerning 
the exchange and protection of classified information.47  
 
Moreover, Draft Article 7 makes clear that:  
 
„The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international 
organization that is placed at the disposal of another international 
                                                             
40  Although „the distinction between organs and agents does not appear to be relevant for the 
purpose of attribution of conduct to an international organisation‟, the „agent‟ definition 
„only covers persons or entities which do not come within the definition under 
subparagraph (c) [that of „organ‟]: Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, resp. 18 & 12.  
41  Even more, the ILC stated in 2005 that „it seems preferable at the current stage of judicial 
developments not to assume that a special rule has come into existence to the effect that, 
when implementing a binding act of the European Community, State authorities would act 
as organs of the European Community‟; ILC, Report of the fifty-seventh session, Responsibility of 
international organisations (2005) UN Doc. A/60/10, Commentary on Part One, Chapter IV, 
95, para. 7. However, since then the ILC has become „less categorical‟, see Hoffmeister, 
above, 729.  
42  See Ahlborn, above, 37. 
43  Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 101. 
44  See e.g. WTO Panel, Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products 
and Foodstuffs (adopted 20 April 2005) WT/DS174/R, para. 7.725. For a more WTO case 
law see Hoffmeister, above, 371-374. 
45  Hoffmeister, op. cit., at. 741 and 742. 
46  First of all, the „rules of the organisation‟ are mentioned in Art. 6(2) itself. However, the 
„lex specialis‟ of Art. 64 (see last sentence) also acknowledges that the „rules of the 
organisation‟ may  
47  See for example the EU-Russia agreement on this matter: Agreement between the Government of 
the Russian Federation and the European Union on the protection of classified information, OJ L155/57. 
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organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter 
organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct.‟  
 
The question, however, is whether the term „placed at the disposal of‟ an 
international organization is applicable at all to the general relationship between the 
EU and its Member States. Only then would the question whether the EU exercises 
effective control over the conduct of its Member States in the area of CFSP and 
CSDP be relevant.48 The question has been addressed in relation to the European 
Community, and there seems to be a consensus that the idea of „effective control‟ 
was not relevant when authorities of Member States merely carry out Community 
law.49 Much more importantly however, as the commentaries to Article 7 reveal, this 
provision is most relevant in relation to civilian and military operations.50 This 
Article deals with the „situation in which the seconded organ or agent still acts to a 
certain extent as organ of the seconding State‟ which „occurs for instance in the case 
of military contingents that a State places at the disposal of the United Nations for a 
peacekeeping operation, since the State retains disciplinary powers and criminal 
jurisdiction over the members of the national contingent‟.51 In contrast to 
„normative control‟ as discussed above, the de facto effective operational control of the 
missions is the deciding factor here.52 The commentaries, by thoroughly analysing 
case law and UN legal opinions, reveal that for UN peacekeeping missions (in 
contrast to UN Security Council authorised military action) the UN will in principle 
bear responsibility, as it exercises effective control.53 It is tempting to apply this 
argument mutatis mutandis to CSDP missions. After all, these missions may be under 
operational control of the EU, through CSDP bodies of the PSC, EUMC (Military 
Committee), EUMS (Military Staff) and the CPCC (Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Committee). However, attribution to the IO is no rigid rule, as the above-mentioned 
                                                             
48  See Chapter X by Tomuschat in this volume. 
49  See Paasivirta and Kuijper, above; as well as PJ Kuijper, „Introduction to the Symposium 
on Responsibility of International Organizations and of (Member) states: Attributed or 
Direct Responsibility or Both?‟ (2010) International Organizations Law Review 9.  
50  The commentaries to Art. 7 deal extensively with those missions, in the context of UN 
missions. See: Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 19-26. Hoffmeister also concludes 
that Art. 7 „was mainly written to codify the rule relating to the international responsibility 
of the United Nations (or regional organisations) for a military operation using the forces 
of its Member States‟: Hoffmeister, above, 726. 
51  See Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 20. 
52  ibid: „The criterion for attribution of conduct either to the contributing State of 
organisation or to the receiving organisation is based according to Art. 7 on the factual 
control that is exercised over the specific conduct taken by the organ or agent placed at the 
receiving organisation‟s disposal‟. 
53  Ibid, 19-26. See also on this point: Blokker, above, 47. In the commentaries, the ILC also 
critiques, as do many academics, the ECtHR position on „effective‟ and „ultimate‟ control in 
the Behrami, Behrami and Saramati cases, see: Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 23 and 
ftnt. 115 for a long list of critical academic contributions.  
14 
 
Srebrenica judgments revealed. A case-by-case analysis and application of the 
„effective control‟ concept is crucial.54 
 
Of possible relevance to the situation in CFSP and CSDP is Article 9 of the Draft 
Articles. On the basis of this Article conduct can also be considered as act of an 
international organization „if and to the extent that the organization acknowledges 
and adopts the conduct is question as its own‟. This article applies only in cases 
where „Conduct […] is not attributable to an international organizations under 
articles 6 to 8‟ and could therefore be seen as an addendum to the general rules of 
attribution. The situation is mirrored by Article 62, which states that a Member State 
of an international organization is responsible for an internationally wrongful act of 
that organization if: „(a) It has accepted responsibility for that act towards the 
injured party; or (b) It has led the injured party to rely on its responsibility.‟ The 
subsidiary nature of this Article 62 responsibility allows for a shared responsibility of 
the organization and its Member States (as do the other Articles on responsibility), 
in contrast to the attribution of conduct under Article 9 (as the other Articles on 
conduct).55 Although it would be rare for a Member State to expressly accept 
responsibility for a wrongful act of the EU, the commentaries (rather vaguely) 
suggest that „acceptance‟ should be widely interpreted. Hence, acceptance may also 
be „implied‟ or could result „from the constituent instrument of the international 
organisation or from other rules of the organisation‟.56 Interestingly enough, the 
commentaries briefly discuss the example of Article 216 TFEU, which states inter 
alia that the Member States are bound by EU international agreements, as an 
example of how this would not amount to „acceptance‟. This is only binding „towards 
the organisation‟ and does not „produce legal effects in relation to third parties‟, as 
the ECJ also held before.57  
 
In the area of CFSP it would be difficult to find „valid‟ cases of acceptance. With 
regard to the second „option‟ of Article 62 – namely that a Member State „has led 
the injured party to rely on its responsibility‟ – the commentaries take an identical 
wide interpretation of „reliance‟. It puts forward a scenario which is not wholly 
                                                             
54  See further on this issue: A. Sari and R.A. Wessel, „International Responsibility for EU 
Military Operations: Finding the EU‟s Place in the Global Accountability Regime‟, in B. 
Van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (Eds.), The Legal Dimension of Global Governance: 
What Role for the EU? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, forthcoming) 
55  See also Kuijper, above, 19 and Hoffmeister, above,727. See also Draft Arts. 19 & 63 
which stipulate the additional nature of the responsibility Arts. under resp. Part Two, Chapter 
IV and Part Five. 
56  Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 97, emphasis added. 




illusory in CFSP, namely when a third party has been led to „reasonably assume that 
they [the Member States] would stand in if the responsible organisation did not have 
the necessary funds for making reparation.‟58 As CSDP missions are in principle 
Member State funded, a third party could reasonably assume that the Member States 
will also stand in if a wrongful act is committed in the course of the mission and 
reparation has to be paid. Moreover, Draft Article 40(2) stipulates that „the members 
of a responsible international organisation shall take all the appropriate measures 
that may be required by the rules of the organisation in order to enable the 
organisation to fulfil its obligations under this Chapter [dealing with reparation].‟ 
Thus, the Member States may also be „drawn into‟ the reparation for Union 
responsibility even if they bear no responsibility for it.  
 
The responsibility of the Union in relation to the role of the Member States is 
indeed at the core of our topic and is most prominently dealt with in Draft Article 
17.59 What happens if the Union adopts a CFSP or CSDP decision which would 
force (or authorize) the Member States to commit an internationally wrongful act? 
Article 17 foresees a number of situations: 
 
„1. An international organization incurs international responsibility if it 
circumvents one of its international obligations by adopting a decision 
binding member States or international organizations to commit an act that 
would be internationally wrongful if committed by the former organization. 
2. An international organization incurs international responsibility if it 
circumvents one of its international obligations by authorizing member 
States or international organizations to commit an act that would be 
internationally wrongful if committed by the former organization and the act 
in question is committed because of that authorization. 
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 apply whether or not the act in question is 
internationally wrongful for the member State or international organizations 
to which the decision or authorization is directed.‟ 
 
Hence, the European Union itself could incur international responsibility both in the 
case of binding decisions addressed to the Member States and when the latter act 
because of an authorization by the Union. It is important to realise that this Article 
                                                             
58  Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 98. 
59  See NM Blokker, „Abuse of the Members: Questions concerning Draft Art. 16 of the Draft 
Arts. on Responsibility of International Organizations‟ (2010) International Organizations Law 
Review 35; as well as J d‟Aspremont, „Abuse of the Legal Personality of International 
Organizations and the Responsibility of Member States‟ (2007) International Organizations 
Law Review 91. 
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applies to „circumvention‟ by the Union and that hence the conduct of the 
„implementing‟ Member State itself need not necessarily be unlawful; it is the 
binding or „authorising act‟ of the Union that, if it were to implement that itself, 
should qualify as unlawful.60  
 
At the same time, Member States may be responsible once they hide behind an 
international organization. Article 61 provides: 
 
„1. A State member of an international organization incurs international 
responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has 
competence in relation to the subject-matter of one of the State‟s 
international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the 
organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have 
constituted a breach of the obligation. 
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether or not the act in question is internationally 
wrongful for the international organization.‟ 
 
As Kuijper rightfully argues:  
 
„This article sets out a series of events that virtually no State could bring 
about all on its own, since it would need at least several other States as 
“partners in crime” in order to incite the organization from the inside to 
commit an act contrary to the Member States‟ international obligations to 
which the organization would not be bound.‟61  
 
Moreover, the EU would have to act not in its „rule-making capacity’ in the Article 17 
situation, which is well imaginable, but in an „operational capacity’ in the Article 61 
situation, something which is less common.62 Nevertheless, also in the relationship 
between the EU and its Member States in the area of CFSP/CSDP these types of 
„abuse‟ are not to be ignored completely. For example, in contrast with the Member 
States, the EU is not Party to the Geneva Refugee Convention. Hypothetically, the 
Member States could then attempt to circumvent their obligations under that treaty, 
namely „using‟ a CSDP mission to act in contravention of the principle of non-
refoulement in order to stop migration flows, for example in a maritime CSDP 
                                                             
60  Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 40-42. 
61  Kuijper, above, 28. See more extensively on Art. 60: E Paasivirta, „Responsibility of a 
Member States of an International Organization: Where Will it End? Comments on Art. 60 
of the ILC Draft on the Responsibility of International Organizations‟ (2010) International 
Organizations Law Review 49. 
62  Kuijper, above, 28. 
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mission.63 It is in particular in this area where the debate on the Union‟s separate 
international legal status finally led to an acceptance of the legal personality of the 
European Union, including all its policy areas. It is in fact the existence of this 
international legal personality alongside the legal personalities of the Member States 
that potentially allow both to play „hide and seek‟. 
 
A number of other, general, situations may be relevant in establishing the division of 
responsibilities between the EU and its Member states in the area of foreign, 
security and defence policy. These situations do not concern the specific relation 
between the organisation and its Member States, but relate more generally to 
relationships between international organizations and states. Nevertheless, we 
briefly address them here as „Member States‟ are not excluded from the definition of 
a „State‟.64 
 
First, Article 14 of the Draft Articles states that:  
 
„An international organization which aids or assists a State or another 
international organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act by the State or the latter organization is internationally responsible for 
doing so if: (a) the former organization does so with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be 
internationally wrongful if committed by that organization.‟65  
 
The mirror image is provided by Article 58, paragraph 1, which establishes under 
the same conditions the international responsibility of „a State which aids or assists 
an international organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act 
[…]‟. Given the close cooperation between the Union and its Member States in the 
formulation and implementation of CFSP and CSDP these provisions are relevant. 
It has been suggested elsewhere that this „aiding or assisting‟ may also well take 
                                                             
63  In the Mediterranean context it is not wholly unimaginable that a CSDP mission would 
come to deal with migrant boats on the move to the EU, as NATO did in 2011. One such 
incident, under which NATO did allegedly not live up to international search and rescue 
obligations leading to the death of 61 migrants, is currently being investigated by the 
Migration Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. See: 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/NewsManager/EMB_NewsManagerView.asp?ID=6789&L
=2  
64  In fact, „States‟ are not defined at all and are not referred to in Draft Art. 2, which defines 
„International organization‟, „Rules of the organization‟, and „Agents‟. 
65  Emphasis added. 
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financial forms.66 Due to the peculiar funding structure of CSDP missions – the 
Member States fund in principle the EU Missions – this may be a possible area of 
attention under Article 58. 
 
A similar situation concerns the responsibility of an international organization that 
directs and controls a state (or another international organization) in the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act.67 This is dealt with in Article 15 of the Draft 
Articles. Again a mirror image can be found, which provides that:  
 
„A State which directs and controls an international organization in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally 
responsible for that act if: (a) the State does so with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be 
internationally wrongful if committed by that State.‟ (Article 59, paragraph 1). 
 
A situation in which Member States direct or control the EU in the execution of 
CFSP/CSDP may be difficult to find, but it is has been suggested that excessive 
control over the decision-making process of an organization could lead to (joint) 
international responsibility.68 Obviously, this would be difficult to reconcile with the 
idea of Member States as „seat holders‟ in an organ of an international organization, 
in which view the decision-making procedure as such is irrelevant as in the end it is 
the organization that takes the decision.69 Situations in which Member States are 
directed or controlled by the Union form the foundation of the CFSP. International 
wrongful acts by states on the basis of binding CFSP/CSDP decisions are thus not 
excluded. 
 
To the abovementioned Articles dealing with State responsibility for aiding, 
assisting, directing and controlling the conduct of international organisations 
(Articles 58 & 59), the ILC has added a second paragraph in the 2011 version of the 
Draft Articles which reads: „An act by a State member of an international 
organisation done in accordance with the rules of the organisation does not as such 
engage the international responsibility of that State under the terms of this draft 
                                                             
66  A Reinisch, „Aid or Assistance and Direction and Control between States and International 
Organizations in the Commission of Internationally Wrongful Acts‟ (2010) International 
Organizations Law Review 70. 
67  See more extensively: Ibid. 
68  J d‟Aspremont, above, 92: „[…] member states exerting an excessive control over the 
decision-making process of the organization must be held, together with the organization, 
responsible for violations of international law committed by the organization‟ 
69  RA Wessel, „Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU‟ (2000) European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 507, 516. 
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Article.‟70 This addition raises the importance of the „rules of the organisation‟ as 
they suggest that it could prevent the international State responsibility from arising if 
the Member States acts in accordance with them. However, it seems to the authors 
that it could also potentially undermine the authority of the Draft Articles, as it 
seems to allow for a „way out‟. Could it possibly mean that, if Member States act on 
the basis of a CFSP decision, in accordance with EU law, they would not be held 
responsible under Articles 58 and 59? The commentary indicates that „These criteria 
could entail some difficulties in ascertaining whether aid or assistance has taken 
place in borderline cases‟ and that this „does not imply that the State would then be 
free to ignore its international obligations‟. This is akin to statements in ECtHR 
judgements, such as in the Bosphorus where the Court held that Member States 
cannot escape scrutiny by „hiding‟ behind the EU to which competences were 
transferred.71 The commentaries go on to state that such international obligations 
„may well encompass the conduct of a State when it acts within an international 
organisation‟, thus leaving the boundaries between international and „internal‟ EU 
law nebulous for the present purposes. Clearly, there is a dilemma here for the ILC or 
at least a paradox for the reader. The commentaries then finish by saying that if such 
a situation would occur, the Member States would still be liable, but under the 
Articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.72 To the 
authors it is rather unclear how this latest addition to the DARIO contributes to a 
clearer delimitation of responsibility. 
 
The Draft Articles foresee situations in which either the organization or the state is 
subject to coercion by the other. The applicable rules can be found in Draft Articles 
16 and 60. In view of the theoretical nature of these provisions with regard to the 
relationship between the EU and its Member States, we leave this possibility out of 
our discussion. 
 
Finally it should be pointed out that a „lex specialis‟ has been added in Article 64 of 
the Draft Articles which stipulates that the these Articles will not apply if „special 
rules of international law‟ such as „rules of the organisation applicable to the 
relations between an international organisation and its members‟ cover the 
responsibility questions. The Commentaries discusses a specific example under 
which these „rules of the organisation‟ may come into play: the European Union and 
its Member States.73 It is thus here that – as we have seen before – the internal rules 
                                                             
70  Emphasis added. 
71  See: 30 June 2005, Application No. 45036/98, Bosphorus v Ireland. 
72  Draft Arts. with commentaries, above, 91. 
73  Ibid, 100-101. 
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of the Union, including those on competences, may make their way into questions 
of international responsibility.  
  
IV. Conclusion: A Competence-Responsibility Gap? 
 
A first glance at the division of international responsibility between the EU and its 
Member States suggests that the EU itself would be primarily responsible for any 
international wrongful acts in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. What 
kind of internationally wrongful act could this be? Obviously, not living up to 
international agreements concluded with third states or other international 
organizations could result in such international responsibility. Also acts by any agent 
of the Union (e.g. the Institutions, but also the High Representative, Special Envoys 
and CSDP missions) which would be in violation of international obligations would 
be attributable to the Union. Given the upgraded role for the EU in global 
governance, more rules have become applicable to its actions. 
 
While one could perhaps argue that there once was a difference between 
Community law and CFSP law, at least post-Lisbon it has become difficult to 
maintain that the constitutional relationship between the Union and its Member 
States differs on the basis of a policy area.74 So far, however, this special relationship 
between the EU and its Member States is not reflected in the Draft Articles. As we 
have seen, the „effective (of „factual‟) control‟ argument may be decisive in 
establishing the division of responsibility between the EU and its Member States in 
very concrete situations in the framework of EU military missions, but the complex 
nature of CSDP decision-making and implementation calls for a case-by-case 
analysis which is to take account of the special position Member States have in 
conducting EU military missions. With its focus on the agency paradigm of 
attribution, the DARIO‟s relevance may be limited in relation to CSDP missions.75 
 
Indeed, the complex nature of the cooperation between the EU and its Member 
States in external situations is not only related to the division of competences, but 
                                                             
74  More extensively: RA Wessel, „The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order‟, above. 
But see for instance Kuijper, above, 21, who argues that „the divide on this point runs right 
across the EU, separating its traditionally supra-national EC part from the 
intergovernmental CFSP-side‟. In his view „the foreign policy powers of Member States are 
unaffected by the fact that certain aspects of foreign- and defense policy are run on a 
common basis‟ (at 20, fn. 36). Cf. also Thym, above, 454, who accepts the „horizontal 
constitutionalisation‟ (the same constitutional control standards apply to all areas of Union 
action), but maintains that Union law is of a different nature in CFSP and CSDP, where it 
is „a manifestation of intergovernmental executive power‟, rather than „law-making‟. 
75  See more extensively: Sari and Wessel, op.cit. 
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also to the actual use of these competences in concrete situations. This allegedly 
makes the assessment of international responsibility even more difficult. Even after 
almost twenty years of CFSP, we have not been able to fully grasp the complexity of 
the relationship between the EU and its Member States relationship in this area. Yet, 
with the increasing external activity of the Union, there is a need to become more 
precise. 
 
In general, the rules in the TEU provide no indications for a conclusion that in 
CFSP/CSDP the Member States would by definition be the first ones to incur 
international responsibility. This would be confirmed by the specific rules on the 
conclusion of EU international agreements, which uniformly cover both CFSP and 
non-CSFP agreements. As most EU external action is based on international 
agreements, this would not amount to a competence-responsibility gap. Yet, as we 
have seen, in the area of CSDP in particular, it may not always be easy to establish 
the actual competence and responsibilities depend on more than just competences. 
 
From our analysis, the contours of how internal CFSP competences influence the 
external responsibility under the DARIO emerge. Although we have seen that the 
Union incurs responsibility, as a point of departure, the specific CFSP/CSDP „rules 
of the organisation‟76 allow for more complex situations. The internal division of 
competences therefore „pierces‟ the institutional veil of the Union, inter alia via the 
acknowledgement of the „rules of the organisation‟. For example, the „rules of the 
organisation‟ are important in determining whether Member States could be seen as 
agents or organs of the Union (cf. Article 6(2)). However, the inverse situation is 
also envisaged, under which the Member States may „hide‟ behind the institutional 
veil of the Union. For example, if they implement binding decisions or 
authorisations they could be freed of international responsibility (cf. Article 17). 
Hence, the internal division of competences is certainly relevant for the allocation of 
responsibility, albeit perhaps more as an exception than as the standard rule. Of 
course, in the implementation of the responsibility, there is a limit; the DARIO also 
stipulates that „the responsible international organisation may not rely on its rules as 
justification for failure to comply with its obligations‟ (Article 32(1)).  
 
Another set of questions relate to the development of the European External 
Action Service and to the emerging diplomatic service in third countries and the 
changing status of the EU in some international organizations. The applicability of 
                                                             
76  Defined in Draft Art. 2 as „in particular, the constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions 
and other acts of the organization adopted in accordance with those instruments, and 
established practice of the organization‟. 
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„state rules‟ in this area to the EU has hardly been touched upon in academic 
writings. 
 
These are just some first thoughts that come to mind when we consider the 
(planned) increasing activities of the Union at the global level. Given the 
particularities of CFSP/CSDP these issue deserve special attention in the study of 
the international responsibility of international organizations.77 
                                                             
77  Please see chapter X by Naert in this volume. 
